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This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which
rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports
its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some
distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one
hand, it departs from the material reading of ‘if then’ exactly in the way we
would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs
from the non-material accounts which hinge on the Ramsey Test, advocated
by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others.
1 overview
Logicians have always been tempted by the thought that ‘if then’ expresses a
relation of support, which can be articulated by saying that the antecedent
of a conditional must provide a reason to accept its consequent, or that the
inference from its antecedent to its consequent must be justified. According
to a view that is traditionally attributed to the Stoics, and most prominently
to Chrysippus, conditionals are inherently related to arguments, in that an
argument is valid just in case the conditional formed with the conjunction
of its premises as antecedent and its conclusion as consequent is true.1 The
same sort of link between conditionals and arguments has been postulated by
several authors in the subsequent debates on conditionals. It is no surprise
that the term ‘consequent’, which derives from the latin ‘consequens’, recalls
to mind the notion of consequence.2 Here is a telling quote from Mill:
When we say, If the Koran comes from God, Mohammed is the
prophet of God, we do not intend to affirm either that the Koran
does come from God, or that Mohammed is really his prophet.
Neither of these simple propositions may be true, and yet the
truth of the hypothetical proposition may be indisputable. What
is asserted is not the truth of either of the propositions, but the
inferribility of the one from the other.3
The thought that ‘if then’ expresses a relation of support owes its intuitive
appeal to the fact that in most cases it is quite natural to paraphrase condi-
tionals by using words such as ’reason’ or ’infer’. Consider the following
examples:
1 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism II, 137.
2 Peter Abelard, and other medieval logicians after him, used the term ‘consequentia’ to refer to a
conditional. As the word suggests, the underlying idea was that conditionals are characterized
by some consequence relation, see Kneale and Kneale [24], p. 215.
3 Mill [32], p. 102.
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(1) If it’s pure cashmere, it will not shrink
(2) If you drink a beer, you’ll feel better
(3) If it is snowing, then it is cold
It seems correct to say that the antecedent of (1) supports its consequent, as
the following reformulations suggest:
(4) If it’s pure cashmere, that is a reason for thinking that it will not shrink
(5) If it’s pure cashmere, we can infer that it will not shrink
Similar considerations hold for (2) and (3). What one wants to say when one
utters (2) is that drinking a beer makes you feel better, so that if you drink it,
you’ll experience that effect. In the case of (3), again, the antecedent provides
a reason to accept the consequent, although here the event described by the
antecedent does not cause the event described by the consequent.
Of course, there are cases in which no paraphrase in terms of ‘reason’ or
‘infer’ is available. Typically, concessive conditionals do not admit reformula-
tions along the lines suggested. Suppose we intend to go out for a walk and
we hope that it will be sunny. We can nevertheless assert what follows:
(6) If it rains, we will go
In this case it would be inappropriate to say that the rain provides evidence
to think that we will go. What we mean, instead, is that we will go anyway,
that is, in spite of the rain. So, (7) and (8) seem correct reformulations of (6):
(7) Even if it rains, we will go
(8) If it rains, we will still go
More generally, concessive conditionals are suitably phrased by using ‘even if’
or ‘still’, and do not imply support in the sense considered. Nonetheless, the
range of cases in which the notion of support seems pertinent is sufficiently
large and representative to deserve separate study.4
Despite the plain intelligibility of paraphrases such as (4) and (5), the
notion of support proves hard to capture at the formal level. This explains
the multiplicity and the heterogeneity of the attempts that have been made
so far to define a connective with the property desired. At least two main
lines of thought have been pursued. One option is to treat conditionals as
strict conditionals and define support in terms of some sort of necessitation:
a conditional is true just in case it is impossible that its antecedent is true
and its consequent is false.5 Another option is to develop a non-monotonic
theory of conditionals which aims at capturing the intuitive understanding
of support.6
4 Gomes [17] aptly emphasizes the contrast between reformulations such as (4) and (5) and
reformulations such as (7) and (8), and draws a distinction between “implicative conditionals”
and concessive conditionals. Some linguists use the label “inferential conditional” to refer
to a specific category of conditionals, see for instance Dancygier [9], Declerck and Reed [11],
Dancygier and Sweetser [10]. Independently of such classifications, all that matters for our
purposes is that many conditionals are implicative or inferential in the obvious sense that they
reflect or express some kind of reasoning.
5 This option has been developed in different ways by Lycan [29], Gillies [16], Kratzer [25], Iacona
[20], and others.
6 Among the most recent attempts, Rott [36] contains a pioneering discussion of ‘if’ and ‘because’,
relying on a variation of the belief revision formalism. The ranking-theoretic account offered in
Spohn [39] explicitly involves the idea of the antecedent as providing a reason for the consequent.
The approach to conditionals outlined in Douven [12] and Douven [13] employs the notion of
evidential support from Bayesian epistemology. Krzyzanowska, Wenmackers, and Douven [22],
van Rooij and Schulz [42], and Berto and Özgün [5] provide further examples.
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The account outlined here belongs to the second category. The interpreta-
tion of ‘if then’ that we will explore develops the idea that a conditional is
true just in case its antecedent provides evidence for its consequent, where
‘provides evidence for’ is another way of saying ‘supports’. This interpre-
tation may be regarded as one coherent reading of ‘if then’, although it is
not necessarily the only admissible reading. We will not address the thorny
question whether there is a unique correct analysis of ‘if then’, because the
main points that we will make can be acknowledged without assuming an
affirmative answer to that question. If different readings of ‘if then’ are
equally admissible, the evidential interpretation is one of them.
Interestingly, the notion of support seems to apply equally well to in-
dicative conditionals and to counterfactuals. Although we will focus on
indicative conditionals, what we will say about this notion can easily be
extended to counterfactuals. In particular, the distinction between evidential
and concessive readings of ‘if then’ is orthogonal to the distinction between
indicative and subjunctive conditionals. For example, the following sentences
exhibit the same difference that obtains between (1) and (6):
(9) If it were cashmere, it would not shrink
(10) If it were raining, we would go
While (9) can be paraphrased by means of sentences that resemble (4) and
(5), the most appropriate reformulations of (10) are sentences that resemble
(7) and (8).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a first informal
sketch of the evidential account and introduces the symbol ., which repre-
sents our reading of ‘if then’.7 Section 3 defines a language that includes .
in addition to the standard symbols of modal propositional logic. Sections
4-8 spell out some important logical properties of .. Section 9 compares the
evidential account with other accounts, in particular with those suggested
by Adams, Stalnaker, and Lewis. Finally, section 10 considers a probabilistic
version of the analysis suggested which defines assertibility in terms of a
quantitative measure of support.
2 the core idea
A rather solid intuition about conditionals such as (1)-(3) is that there seems
to be some sort of clash between their antecedent and the negation of their
consequent. For example, insofar as one accepts (1), one will find that ‘it’s
pure cashmere’, and ‘it will shrink’ do not go well together, where ‘it will
shrink’ amounts to the negation of ‘it will not shrink’. Similar considerations
hold for (2) and (3). Long time ago, Chrysippus expressed this intuition in a
remarkably straightforward way:
A conditional holds whenever the denial of its consequent is
incompatible with its antecedent.8
Assuming that the negation of a sentence is true just in case the sentence
is false, this is to say that a conditional holds whenever the falsity of its
consequent is incompatible with the truth of its antecedent. Of course, the
word ‘incompatible’ may be construed in different ways, and nobody knows
what Chrysippus exactly had in mind. But we believe that there is at least
7 This symbol is borrowed from Spohn [39].
8 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, II, 110-12.
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one coherent reading of his claim that accords with the thought that ‘if then’
epxresses a relation of support.9
The core idea of the evidential account is that a conditional α . β is true
if and only if α and ∼β are incompatible in the following sense: if α is true,
then β cannot easily be false, and if β is false, then α cannot easily be true.
This is a conjunction because we assume that incompatibility is a symmetric
relation: α is incompatible with ∼β if and only if ∼β is incompatible with α.
So, the incompatibility claim can be read both from left to right and from
right to left. The first condition — if α is true, then β cannot easily be false
— expresses the left-to-right reading of the claim, that is, ‘α is incompatible
with ∼β’. The second condition — if β is false, then α cannot easily be true
— expresses the right-to-left reading of the claim, which emerges clearly in
Chrysippus’ formulation, that is, ‘∼β is incompatible with α’.
These two conditions can be spelled out in terms of comparative measures
of distance from the actual world. The first requires that the worlds in which
α is true and β is false are distant from the actual world if compared with
those in which α and β are both true. This is essentially the Ramsey Test
as understood by Stalnaker and Lewis: in the closest worlds in which α is
true, β must be true as well.10 The second, which is seldom discussed in the
literature on conditionals, requires that the worlds in which α is true and β
is false are distant from the actual world if compared with those in which α
and β are both false. This may be labeled Reverse Ramsey Test: in the closest
worlds in which β is false, α must be false as well. We will call Chrysippus
Test the conjunction of the Ramsey Test and the Reverse Ramsey Test, as we
take the quote above to suggest that the latter is at least as important as the
former.
To illustrate the Chrysippus Test, consider the following diagrams, where
11, 10, 01, 00 indicate the combinations of truth values of α and β, and the
length of each dashed line indicates the distance from the actual world of
the closest world in which the respective combination occurs:
— — — 11
— — — — — 10
01
— — 00





— — — 10
01
— — — — — 00
In the first case α . β is true, because both the Ramsey Test and the Reverse
Ramsey Test are satisfied: 11-worlds and 00-worlds are closer than 10-worlds.
In the second case α . β is false, because it does not pass the Ramsey Test:
9 For extensive discussions of the passage quoted, see Sanford [38], p. 25, Lenzen [26], pp. 15-19.
10 The Ramsey Test comes from Ramsey [35]. Stalnaker [40] and Lewis [28] adopt the modal
interpretation suggested.
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10-worlds are closer than 11-worlds. In the third case, again, α . β is false,
but this time because it does not pass the Reverse Ramsey Test: 10-worlds
are closer than 00-worlds.
The Chrysippus Test is stronger than the Ramsey Test exactly in the way
that seems required in order to preserve the intuition that α must support
β. Consider a situation like that depicted in the third diagram, that is, a
scenario in which β is very likely regardless of α, and in which we would be
inclined to say that β does not hold in virtue of α. For example,
(11) If you drink a beer, the sun will rise tomorrow
In this case the Reverse Ramsey Test, unlike the Ramsey Test, is not satisfied.
Although the closest worlds in which you drink a beer are worlds in which
the sun will rise tomorrow, it is not the case that the closest worlds in which
the sun will not rise tomorrow are worlds in which you don’t drink a beer.
Even if the absence of sunrise is a remote possibility, its distance from the
actual world does not depend on your beer. Thus, an account of conditionals
based on the Chrysippus Test, unlike one which relies solely on the Ramsey
Test, will predict that (11) is false. The latter prediction is exactly what one
should expect from the evidential interpretation: the antecedent of (11) does
not provide a reason for accepting its consequent.11
In order to provide a perspicuous representation of comparative measures
of distance, we will employ the system of spheres adopted by Lewis in his
semantics for counterfactuals. We will imagine non-actual worlds as ordered
in a set of spheres around the actual world, depending on their degree
of similarity to the actual world. This is a reasonably neutral formal tool
which can be used without being committed to the rest of Lewis’ view about
conditionals and modal metaphysics.12
In the framework of the system of spheres, the Ramsey Test requires that,
unless α is impossible, that is, true in no world, there is a 10-free sphere — a
sphere that contains no 10-worlds — in which α is true in some world. For if
there is such a sphere, some 11-worlds are closer to the actual world than
any 10-world. The Reverse Ramsey Test requires instead that, unless β is
necessary, that is, true in every world, there is a 10-free sphere in which β
is false in some worlds. For if there is such a sphere, some 00-worlds are
closer to the actual world than any 10-world. The Chrysippus Test thus
requires that, unless α is impossible or β is necessary, there is a 10-free sphere
in which α is true in some world and β is false in some world. α . β is
non-vacuously true when there is such a sphere.
This account of non-vacuous truth can reasonably be combined with a
standard characterization of vacuous truth. We will assume that α . β is
vacuously true when α is impossible, for it is vacuously the case both that if
α is true, then β cannot easily be false, and that if β is false, then α cannot
easily be true. Similarly, we will assume that α . β is vacuously true when β
is necessary, for again both conditions are satisfied. In other words, if α is
impossible or β is necessary, then α and ∼β are vacuously incompatible.
3 definitions
To phrase in formal terms what we have just said, we will define a language
called L. The symbols of L are the letters p, q, r, ..., the connectives ∼,⊃
11 Rott [36], Douven [12], and others have discussed similar examples and explained their unac-
ceptability in different ways.
12 Lewis [28], pp. 13-19.
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,∧,∨, .,,♦, and the brackets (, ). The formulas of L are defined by induction
in the usual way: p, q, r... are formulas; if α is a formula, ∼α,α,♦α are
formulas; if α and β are formulas, α ⊃ β, α ∧ β, α ∨ β, α . β are formulas.
definition 1 Given a non-empty set W, a system of spheres O over W is an
assignment to each w ∈W of a set Ow of non-empty sets of elements of W —
a set of spheres around w — such that:
1. if S ∈ Ow and S′ ∈ Ow, then either S ⊆ S′ or S′ ⊆ S;
2. {w} ∈ Ow;
3. if S 6= ⋃Ow, then there is a S′ such that S ⊂ S′ and S′ ⊆ S′′ for every
S′′ such that S ⊂ S′′.
Clause 1 says that Ow is nested. This condition rules out that two spheres
S, S′ and two worlds w′, w′′ are such that w′ ∈ S but w′ /∈ S′ and w′′ ∈ S′ but
w′′ /∈ S. For it cannot be the case that w′ is more similar to w than w′′ and
w′′ is more similar to w than w′.
Clause 2 implies that Ow is centered on w. If {w} ∈ Ow, then by clause
1 we have that, for every S ∈ Ow, {w} ⊆ S, given that S is assumed to be
non-empty. This means that w belongs to every sphere around w. The idea is
that the innermost sphere is a singleton because no other world is as similar
to w as w itself is.
Clause 3 states the limit assumption, according to which, for every sphere
smaller than
⋃
Ow, there is a smallest sphere around S: getting closer and
closer to S we eventually reach a limit. In the specific case in which S = {w},
this means that some sphere contains the worlds closest to w. Although
Lewis finds this assumption questionable for metaphysical reasons, we think
that we can live with it.13
definition 2 A model for L is an ordered triple 〈W, O, V〉, where W is a
nonempty set, O is a system of spheres over W, and V is a valuation function
such that, for each atomic formula α of L and each w ∈W, V(α, w) ∈ {1, 0}.
definition 3 The truth conditions of a formula of L in a world w in a
model are as follows:
1 If α is atomic, [α]w = 1 iff V(α, w) = 1;
2 [∼α]w = 1 iff [α]w = 0;
3 [α ∧ β]w = 1 iff [α]w = 1 and [β]w = 1;
4 [α ∨ β]w = 1 iff either [α]w = 1 or [β]w = 1;
5 [α ⊃ β]w = 1 iff either [α]w = 0 or [β]w = 1;
6 [α . β]w = 1 iff the following conditions hold:
(a) for every w′ ∈ ⋃Ow, if [α]w′ = 1 and there are no w′′ and S such
that w′′ ∈ S, w′ /∈ S, and [α]w′′ = 1, then [β]w′ = 1;
(b) for every w′ ∈ ⋃Ow, if [β]w′ = 0 and there are no w′′ and S such
that w′′ ∈ S, w′ /∈ S, and [β]w′′ = 0, then [α]w′ = 0;
13 Further constraints on O might be added. One is closure under union: if S ⊆ Ow and
⋃
S is the
set of all w′ such that w′ belongs to some member of S, then
⋃
S ∈ Ow. Another is closure under
intersection: if S ⊆ Ow and
⋂
S is the set of all w′ such that w′ belongs to every member of S,⋂




Ow′ ;. Although each
of these additional constraint is reasonable, none of them is strictly necessary for our purposes.
See Lewis [28], pp. 14-15, 120-121.
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7 [α]w = 1 iff, for every w′ in every S ∈ Ow, [α]w′ = 1;
8 [♦α]w = 1 iff, for some w′ in some S ∈ Ow, [α]w′ = 1.
In clause 6, (a) expresses the Ramsey Test: β must be true in the closest
worlds in which α is true. (b) expresses the Reverse Ramsey Test: α must be
false in the closest worlds in which β is false. Note that if α is impossible, the
antecedent of (a) is false for every world, and the consequent of (b) is true
for every world. Similarly, if β is necessary, the consequent of (a) is true for
every world, and the antecedent of (b) is false for every world. This means
that α . β is vacuously true when α is impossible or β is necessary. Instead,
when α is true in some world and β is false is some world, (a) and (b) entail
that there is a 10-free sphere where α is true in some world and β is false in
some world.
Validity is defined in terms of truth in a world in a model, and logical
consequence is defined accordingly for every finite set of formulas α1, ..., αn
and every formula β.
definition 4  α iff α is true in every world in every model.
definition 5 α1, ...αn  β iff  (α1 ∧ ...∧ αn) ⊃ β.
In the following sections we will employ these definitions to elucidate
the logical features of the evidential interpretation. From now on, we will
reason on an arbitrary model 〈W, O, V〉, and we will refer to conditions (a)
and (b) of clause 6 of definition 3.
4 some relatively uncontroversial principles
Let us start with five basic and relatively uncontentious principles that hold
for ⊃. The first is Modus Ponens: from a conditional and its antecedent one
can infer its consequent. This is the simplest and most fundamental rule of
inference involving conditionals, and most theorists of conditionals agree on
its centrality. The evidential account validates Modus Ponens:
fact 1 α . β, α  β (Modus Ponens X)
Proof. Assume that [α . β]w = 1 and [α]w = 1. Then, given (a), it follows that
[β]w = 1, for w is the closest world in which α is true.
The second principle, Superclassicality, says that a conditional is true if
its consequent logically follows from its antecedent. This principle is very
reasonable from the evidential point of view, for if β logically follows from α,
then α provides a conclusive reason for accepting β.
fact 2 If α  β, then  α . β (Superclassicality X)
Proof. Assume that α  β. Then, for every w, there is no w′ such that [α]w′ = 1
and [β]w′ = 0, which entails that (a) and (b) are both satisfied. Therefore,
[α . β]w = 1.
The third principle, Identity, says that every conditional whose consequent
is identical to the antecedent is true. The evidential account validates this
principle, as is plausible to expect:
fact 3  α . α (Identity X)
Proof. This directly follows from fact 2, given that α  α.
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Two further principles, which involve the operators and ♦, are Necessary
Consequent and Impossible Antecedent: a conditional is true if its consequent is
necessary or its antecedent is impossible. The evidential account validates
these two principles, given its treatment of vacuous truth:
fact 4 α  β . α (Necessary Consequent X)
Proof. Assume that [α]w = 1. Then by definition [β . α]w = 1.
fact 5 ∼♦α  α . β (Impossible Antecedent X)
Proof. Assume that [∼♦α]w = 1. Then by definition [α . β]w = 1.
The five principles considered are relatively uncontentious in that most
theories of conditionals preserve them. This does not mean, of course, that
they are universally accepted. In particular, Necessary Consequent and
Impossible Antecedent might be regarded as problematic, as it might be
contended that there is a sense in which the antecedent of a vacuosuly true
conditional is not relevant to its consequent.14
5 some highly controversial principles
Now we will show that the evidential account invalidates some highly con-
tentious principles that characterize ⊃. In the material interpretation, False
Antecedent and True Consequent hold, that is, the mere falsity of the antecedent
or the mere truth of the consequent suffices for the truth of the conditional.
This is commonly regarded as a reason to doubt the material interpretation.
For example, it is quite implausible that the following sentences are true:
(12) If the Colisseum is not in Rome, then I won the lottery
(13) If the Colisseum is in Rome, then I did not win the lottery15
. differs from ⊃ in this respect. On the evidential account, (12) and (13)
are false: it is easy to see that (12) fails the Ramsey Test and (13) fails the
Reverse Ramsey Test. More generally, False Antecedent and True Consequent
are invalid.
fact 6 ∼α 2 α . β (False Antecedent ×)
Proof. Suppose that [α]w = 0 and that, for some w′, [α]w′ = 1, [β]w′ = 0, and
w′ ∈ S for every S 6= {w}. In this case [∼α]w = 1. But [α . β]w = 0, for w′
violates (a).
fact 7 β 2 α . β (True Consequent ×)
Proof. Suppose that [β]w = 1 and that, for some w′, [α]w′ = 1, [β]w′ = 0, and
w′ ∈ S for every S 6= {w}. In this case [α . β]w = 0, for w′ violates (b).
A closely related principle that holds for ⊃ is Linearity: for any α and
β, either the conditional with antecedent α and consequent β holds, or the
conditional with antecedent β and consequent α holds. For example, the
following disjunction is true in the material interpretation:
14 Priest [33], pp. 72-77 spells out this objection. Relevant logicians are unwilling to grant Necessary
Consequent and Impossible Antecedent, see Mares [30]. Another example is Gomes [18], pp.
3-4, where these principles are rejected on the basis of considerations about the pragmatics of
conditionals.
15 Edgington [14], section 2.3, presents False Antecedent and True Consequent as “the best-known
objection to the material account”.
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(14) Either if it is snowing then I will win the lottery or if I will win the
lottery then it is snowing
Again, . differs from ⊃ in this respect. On the evidential account, (14) is false
because in each disjunct the antecedent and the consequent are not related
in the right way. More generally, the evidential account invalidates Linearity.
fact 8 2 (α . β) ∨ (β . α) (Linearity ×)
Proof. Suppose that [α]w = 0 and [β]w = 0. Let w′ and w′′ be such that
[α]w′ = 1, [β]w′ = 0, [α]w′′ = 0, [β]w′′ = 1, and that w′ ∈ S and w′′ ∈ S for
every S 6= {w}. In this case [α . β]w = 0 because w′ violates (a). Moreover,
[β . α]w = 0 because w′′ violates (a).
Another closely related principle that holds for ⊃ is Conditional Proof :
if α, together with a set of premises Γ, entails β, then the conditional with
antecedent α and consequent β follows from Γ. This principle entails False
Antecedent and True Consequent, so it is inconsistent with any account that
rejects False Antecedent and True Consequent.
fact 9 Not: if Γ, α  β, then Γ  α . β (Conditional Proof ×)
Proof. Suppose that the following holds: if Γ, α  β, then Γ  α . β. Since
∼α, α  β and β, α  β, we get that ∼α  α . β and β  α . β, contrary to facts
6 and 7.
Two further properties of ⊃ are widely regarded as undesirable. One is
Monotonicity, the principle according to which one can always strengthen the
antecedent of a conditional by adding any conjunct. The other is Transitivity,
the principle according to which a conditional with antecedent α and con-
sequent β and a conditional with antecedent β and consequent γ together
entail the conditional with antecedent α and consequent γ. Examples such
as the following, due to Adams, have been taken to show — and plausibly
so, we think — that conditionals as they are used in ordinary language are
neither monotonic nor transitive:
If Brown wins the election, Smith will retire to private life. There-
fore, if Smith dies before the election and Brown wins it, Smith
will retire to private life.
If Brown wins the election, Smith will retire to private life. If
Smith dies before the election, Brown will win it. Therefore, if
Smith dies before the election, then he will retire to private life.16
The evidential account can explain the apparent invalidity of these ar-
guments. It is possible that the premise of the first argument is true but its
conclusion is false, for only the former passes the Ramsey Test. Similarly, it
is possible that the premises of the second argument are true but its conclu-
sion is false, for only the former pass the Ramsey Test. More generally, the
evidential account invalidates Monotonicity and Transitivity.
fact 10 α . γ 2 (α ∧ β) . γ (Monotonicity ×)
Proof. Suppose that [α . γ]w = 1 and, for some S, there is no w′ ∈ S such
that [β]w′ = 1. Suppose also that outside S there is a w′′ such that [α]w′′ = 1,
[β]w′′ = 1, [γ]w′′ = 0, and w′′ belongs to every S′ bigger than S. In this case
[(α ∧ β) . γ]w = 0 because w′′ violates (a).
16 Adams [1], p. 166.
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fact 11 α . β, β . γ 2 α . γ (Transitivity ×)
Proof. If Transitivity were valid, then Monotonicity would be valid as well,
contrary to fact 10. Since [(α ∧ γ) . α]w = 1 by fact 2, if one assumes that
[α . β]w = 1, by Transitivity one gets that [(α ∧ γ) . β]w = 1.
6 contraposition and right weakening
The facts outlined in sections 4 and 5 are results on which most non-material
accounts of conditionals tend to converge: Modus Ponens, Superclassicality,
Identity, Necessary Consequent, and Impossible Antecedent are widely
accepted as sound, while False Antecedent, True Consequent, Linearity,
Monotonicity, and Transitivity are widely regarded as counterintuitive. The
principles considered in this section and in the next two, instead, are more
divisive. As we shall see, the evidential account crucially differs from other
non-material accounts with respect to these principles.
The evidential account preserves Contraposition, the principle according
to which a conditional with antecedent α and consequent β entails the
conditional with antecedent ∼β and consequent ∼α. To illustrate, consider
the inference from (1) to (15):
(15) If it shrinks, then it is not pure cashmere
This inference seems valid, and the same goes for similar inferences that
involve (2) and (3) as premises. More generally, Contraposition holds for .:
fact 12 α . β  ∼β .∼α (Contraposition X)
Proof. Assume that [α . β]w = 1. Then (a), for every w′, if [α]w′ = 1 and there
are no w′′ and S such that w′′ ∈ S, w′ /∈ S, and [α]w′′ = 1, then [β]w′ = 1, and
(b) for every w′, if [β]w′ = 0 and there are no w′′ and S such that w′′ ∈ S,
w′ /∈ S, and [β]w′′ = 0, then [α]w′ = 0. (a) and (b) are respectively (b) and (a)
for ∼β .∼α. Therefore, [∼β .∼α]w = 1.
This is a distinctive feature of the evidential account. Unlike the principles
considered in the previous two sections, Contraposition is neither widely
accepted nor widely rejected. Some theorists of conditionals regard it as
counterintuitive. Here is a classical example due to Stalnaker:
‘If the US halts the bombing, then North Vietnam will not agree
to negotiate’. A person would believe that this statement is true if
he thought that the North Vietnamese were determined to press
for a complete withdrawal of US troops. But he would surely
deny the contrapositive, ‘If North Vietnam agrees to negotiate,
then the US will not have halted the bombing’.17
However, these examples can hardly prove that Contraposition fails in
the evidential interpretation. As has been noted by Lycan, Bennett, Gomes,
and others, the alleged counterexamples to Contraposition typically involve
a concessive reading of the premise. So, they loose their grip on any in-
terpretation which rules out such a reading.18 This is precisely the case in
point: concessive conditionals are false from the evidential point of view. The
conditional ‘If the US halts the bombing, then North Vietnam will not agree
to negotiate’ does not pass the Reverse Ramsey Test, for it is not the case that
17 Stalnaker [40], p. 39.
18 Lycan [29], p. 34, Bennett [4], pp. 32 and 143-144, Gomes [17].
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the closest worlds in which North Vietnam will agree to negotiate are worlds
in which the US keep bombing. If North Vietnam will not agree to negotiate,
it is not because the US halts the bombing, but in spite of that fact. More
generally, insofar as the alleged counterexamples to Contraposition involve
a concessive reading of the premise, they do not work in the evidential
interpretation because their premise turns out to be false.
A closely related fact concerns Right Weakening, the principle according
to which, if γ logically follows from β, then a conditional with antecedent α
and consequent β entails the conditional with antecedent α and consequent
γ. This principle does not hold for .. Consider the following example, taken
from Rott:
It makes perfect sense to say ‘If you pay an extra fee, your letter
will be delivered by express’, because the fee will buy you a
special service. But it sounds odd to say ‘If you pay an extra
fee, your letter will be delivered’, because the letter would be
delivered anyway, even if you did not pay the extra fee.19
The first conditional is definitely plausible from the evidential point of view.
There is a clear sense in which the payment of the extra fee constitutes a
reason for thinking that the letter will be delivered by express. However,
the second conditional is not equally plausible. The payment of the extra
fee, at least in some sense, does not constitute a reason for thinking that the
letter will be delivered: if you expect that the letter will be delivered, it is
not in virtue of the extra fee. The key to our understanding of this difference
is the Reverse Ramsey Test. Among the worlds in which the letter will not
be delivered by express, those in which you did not pay the extra fee are
closer than those in which you paid it. But there is no reason to think that,
among the worlds in which the letter will not be delivered, those in which
you did not pay the extra fee are closer than those in which you paid it.
The closest worlds in which the letter is not delivered will rather have other
kinds of features, like the occurrence of some accident, in virtue of which
the delivery failed altogether, regardless of your payment of the extra fee.
Therefore, it is consistent with the evidential account to say that the first
conditional is true but the second is false. And since the consequent of the
first — once naturally formalized in a propositional language — entails the
consequent of the second, this means that the evidential account invalidates
Right Weakening.
fact 13 Not: if β  γ, then α . β  α . γ (Right Weakening ×)
Proof. Right Weakening fails because it entails Monotonicity, given Contrapo-
sition. Assume that [α . γ]w = 1. By fact 12, this entails that [∼γ .∼α]w = 1.
Since ∼α  ∼α ∨ ∼β, if Right Weakening were valid, we would get that
[∼γ . (∼α ∨ ∼β)]w = 1, and so that [∼(∼α ∨ ∼β) . ∼∼γ]w = 1 again by
fact 12. Since ∼(∼α ∨∼β) .∼∼γ is logically equivalent to (α ∧ β) . γ, this
means that [(α ∧ β) . γ]w = 1, contrary to fact 10.
This proof makes explicit the connection between Contraposition and
Right Weakening: if Monotonicity fails, then either Contraposition or Right
Weakening must fail as well. This is why facts 12 and 13 are closely related.
19 Rott [37], p. 6.
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7 conditional excluded middle and conjunctive sufficiency
One rather debated principle is Conditional Excluded Middle: for every α and
β, either the conditional with antecedent α and consequent β holds, or the
conditional with antecedent α and consequent ∼β holds. Some non-material
accounts of conditionals retain this principle, while others deny it. The
evidential account belongs to the second category. Consider the following
sentences:
(16) If planet nine exists, then the EU will collapse within 5 years
(17) If planet nine exists, then the EU will not collapse within 5 years
Since there is no relation at all between the existence of planet nine and the
collapse of the EU, it is quite reasonable to say that (16) and (17) are both
false. So, the same goes for the disjunction of (16) and (17). This is exactly
what the evidential account predicts, given that neither (16) nor (17) pass
the Chrysippus Test. More generally, Conditional Excluded Middle does not
hold for .:
fact 14 2 (α . β) ∨ (α .∼β) (Conditional Excluded Middle ×)
Proof. Suppose that [α]w = 1 and [β]w = 0. Let w′ be such that [α]w′ = 1,
[β]w′ = 1, and w′ ∈ S for every S 6= {w}. In this case [α . β]w = 0 because w
violates both (a) and (b). Moreover, [α .∼β]w = 0, for w′ violates (b).
Another debated principle that fails on the evidential account is Conjunc-
tive Sufficiency, according to which any conjunction entails the corresponding
conditional. Even supposing that the antecedent and the consequent of (16)
are both true, it does not follow that (16) is true. The same goes for (17). We
take the failure of Conjunctive Sufficiency to be a desirable result. If α and β
are totally unrelated, it is definitely false that α provides a reason to accept β,
or that β can be inferred from α.
fact 15 α ∧ β 2 α . β (Conjunctive Sufficiency ×)
Proof. Suppose that [α]w = 1, [β]w = 1, and for some w′, [α]w′ = 1, [β]w′ = 0,
and w′ ∈ S for every S 6= {w}. In this case [α ∧ β]w = 1. But [α . β]w = 0, for
w′ violates (b).
Conditional Excluded Middle and Conjunctive Sufficiency somehow stem
from the very same assumption, namely, that the negation of a conditional
with antecedent α and consequent β entails the conditional with antecedent
α and consequent ∼β. If this assumption is granted, then Conditional
Excluded Middle straightforwardly follows from Excluded Middle. Moreover,
Conjunctive Sufficiency can be derived by reductio, for if one assumes α ∧ β
and the negation of the conditional with antecedent α and consequent β, one
gets β and ∼β. The evidential account rejects this key assumption: ∼(α . β)
does not entail α .∼β. Therefore, (α . β) ∨ (α .∼β) does not follow from
(α . β) ∨∼(α . β), and α . β is not derivable from α ∧ β by reductio.
Fact 15 is particularly interesting because it shows that a principled
distinction can be drawn between two claims that are usually conflated. One
is centering, understood as a condition on the system of spheres that is based
on a metaphysical assumption. The other is Conjunctive Sufficiency, the
logical rule just discussed. In the semantic framework offered by Lewis, if
one assumes centering, one gets Conjunctive Sufficiency. As Lewis himself
suggests, one can avoid this result by replacing centering with weak centering,
12
that is, by replacing clause 2 of definition 1 with the condition that w belongs
to every sphere around w, without requiring that the innermost sphere is a
singleton.20 This is why in the literature on conditionals it is quite common
to talk about Conjunctive Sufficiency and centering as if they were the same
thing. However, this coincidence breaks down in our semantic framework:
even if one assumes centering, as in definition 1, one does not get Conjunctive
Sufficiency. This shows that the question whether Conjunctive Sufficiency
holds does not reduce to the choice between centering and weak centering.
As a matter of fact centering plays no essential role in our account, for the
Chrysippus Test could be phrased equally well by assuming weak centering.
But independently of the considerations that may lead one to choose between
centering and weak centering, the point is that the choice has no effect on
Conjunctive Sufficiency.
8 connexivity
The last set of principles that we will consider has been extensively discussed
in relation to connexive logics. Connexive logics are characterized by two
main theses, Aristotle’s Thesis and Boethius’ Thesis. The former says that the
negation of a conditional with antecedent α and consequent ∼α is always
true. The latter says that if a conditional with antecedent α and consequent β
is true, then the conditional with antecedent α and consequent ∼β is false.
Some connexivists have suggested that an account of conditionals based on
a suitable reading of Chrysippus’s claim can capture the intuitive esssence
of Aristotle’s Thesis and Boethius’ Thesis, and we are inclined to agree with
them.21
We believe that the idea of connexivity rests on a solid intuition, although
we doubt that Aristotle’s Thesis and Boethius’ Thesis hold unrestrictedly.
Consider the following sentence:
(18) If it is snowing, then it is not snowing
It is natural to feel that there is something wrong in (18), and this feeling can
hardly be dispelled by noting that (18) is false if it is snowing, as the material
interpretation predicts. So we find it plausible to say that the negation of (18)
is true no matter whether it is snowing or not. This does not mean, however,
that every conditional whose consequent is the negation of the antecedent is
intuitively false. For example, we have no clear intuitions about (19):
(19) If it is not the case that either it is snowing or it is not snowing, then
either it is snowing or it is not snowing
Similar considerations hold for Boethius’ thesis. We find it plausible to say
that if (3) is true, the following conditional is false:
(20) If it is snowing, then it is not cold
However, it is not obvious that the same holds for any two conditionals of
the same form. As far as we can see, it is reasonable to think that (21) and
(22) are both true:
(21) If it is snowing and it is not snowing, then it is snowing
(22) If it is snowing and it is not snowing, then it is not snowing
20 Lewis [28], p. 29
21 McCall [31] and Wansing [44] suggest that the idea of connexivity goes back to Chrysippus.
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More generally, we think that Aristotle’s thesis and Boethius’ thesis are
plausible insofar as they entail two weaker claims. One is Restricted Aris-
totle’s Thesis: whenever α is possible, the negation of the conditional with
antecedent α and consequent ∼α is true. The other is Restricted Abelard’s The-
sis: whenever α is possible, the negation of the conjunction of the conditional
with antecedent α and consequent β and the conditional with antecedent
α and consequent ∼β is true. This is a restricted version of Abelard’s First
Principle — the negation of the conjunction of a conditional with antecedent α
and consequent β and the conditional with antecedent α and consequent ∼β
is always true — which is in turn a conjunctive version of Boethius’ Thesis.22
A third connexive thesis that deserves attention is Aristotle’s Second Thesis:
the negation of the conjunction of a conditional with antecedent α and
consequent β and the conditional with antecedent ∼α and consequent β
is always true.23 As in the case of Aristotle’s Thesis and Boethius’ Thesis,
we think that this thesis is plausible as long as we restrict consideration to
non-vacuously true conditionals. For example, it reasonable to deny the
conjunction of (1) and (23):
(23) If it is not pure cashmere, it will not shrink
Yet it is not equally reasonable to deny the conjunction of (24) and (25):
(24) If it is snowing, then either it is snowing or it is not snowing
(25) If it is not snowing, then either it is snowing or it is not snowing
More generally, we think that Aristotle’s Second Thesis is plausible insofar
as it entails a weaker principle, Restricted Aristotle’s Second Thesis: whenever
β is not necessary, the negation of the conjunction of a conditional with
antecedent α and consequent β and the conditional with antecedent ∼α and
consequent β is true.
The evidential account implies exactly what we would expect. First, (18)
can be denied because it blatantly fails both the Ramsey Test and the Reverse
Ramsey Test. Second, the conjunction of (3) and (20) can be denied because
if (3) is true, then (20) is false: it is impossible that both (3) and (20) pass the
Ramsey Test. Third, the conjunction of (1) and (23) can be denied because if
(1) is true, then (23) is false: it is impossible that both (1) and (23) pass the
Reverse Ramsey Test. Instead, (19), (21), and (22) are vacuously true because
their antecedent is impossible, and similarly (24) and (25) are vacuously true
because their consequent is necessary.24
Now we will prove that Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis, Restricted Abelard’s
Thesis, and Restricted Aristotle’s Second Thesis hold for .. In order to do so,
we will prove a stronger principle, Restricted Selectivity:25
fact 16 If β  ∼γ, then ♦α, α . β  ∼(α . γ) (Restricted Selectivity X)
Proof. Assume that β  ∼γ, [♦α]w = 1, and [α . β]w = 1. Since [♦α]w = 1, α
is true in some worlds. Since [α . β]w = 1, for every w′ such that [α]w′ = 1
and there are no w′′ and S such that w′′ ∈ S, w′ /∈ S, and [α]w′′ = 1, then
22 More precisely, it is a conjunctive version of Weak Boethius’ Thesis, see Wansing [44]. Abelard’s
First Principle is what Angell [3] called “principle of subjunctive contrariety”. Unterhuber [41],
Lenzen [27], Kapsner [23], Iacona [21], consider restricted versions of connexive principles.
23 See McCall [31], Estrada Gonzáles and Ramı́rez-Cámara [15], pp. 346-348.
24 In this respect, a possible divergence from Chrysippus’ original view must be acknowledged,
for it is a controversial matter whether he regarded conditionals with impossible antecedents as
true.
25 See Huber [19], p. 531.
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[β]w′ = 1. Since β  ∼γ, it follows that [∼γ]w′ = 1. So [γ]w′ = 0. Therefore,
[α . γ]w = 0, and consequently [∼(α . γ)]w = 1.
fact 17 ♦α  ∼((α . β) ∧ (α .∼β)) (Restricted Abelard’s Thesis X)
Proof. Assume that [♦α]w = 1. Since β  ∼∼β, if [α . β]w = 1, by fact
16 we get that [∼(α . ∼β)]w = 1, hence that [α . ∼β]w = 0. Therefore,
[(α . β) ∧ (α .∼β)]w = 0.
fact 18 ♦α  ∼(α .∼α) (Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis X)
Proof. Assume that [♦α]w = 1. Since [α . α]w = 1 by fact 3, we get that
[α .∼α]w = 0, because fact 17 entails that [(α . α)∧ (α .∼α)]w = 0. Therefore,
[∼(α .∼α)]w = 1.
fact 19 ♦∼β  ∼((α . β) ∧ (∼α . β)) (Restricted Aristotle’s Second Thesis X)
Proof. Assume that [♦∼β]w = 1. If [α . β]w = 1, then [∼β .∼α]w = 1 by fact
12. So, [∼(∼β . α)]w = 1 by fact 16, given that ∼α  ∼α. This means that
[∼β . α]w = 0, and consequently that [∼α . β]w = 0, for ∼β . α and ∼α . β
have the same truth conditions (switch (a) and (b) as in the proof of fact 12).
Therefore, [(α . β) ∧ (∼α . β)]w = 0.
It is important to note that the four principles just considered, unlike their
unrestricted counterparts, imply no revision of classical logic. This turns out
clear if one thinks that the same principles hold in the strict interpretation
simply as theorems of standard modal logic. While the systems of connexive
logic are typically contra-classical, in that they are neither subsystems nor
extensions of classical logic, the form of restricted connexivity suggested
here can be preserved without adopting such a system.26
9 comparisons
The facts set out in sections 4-8 delineate the distinctive logical profile of the
evidential interpretation. The evidential interpretation substantially departs
from the material interpretation in that it invalidates False Antecedent,
True Consequent, Linearity, Conditional Proof, Monotonicity, Transitivity,
and Right Weakening, while it validates Restricted Selectivity, Restricted
Aristotle’s Thesis, Restricted Abelard’s Thesis, and Restricted Aristotle’s
Second thesis. Moreover, it differs from the strict interpretation because the
latter retains Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Right Weakening.27 In terms of
strength, the evidential interpretation lies between these two interpretations.
If α J β abbreviates (α ⊃ β), this is to say that α J β entails α . β and α . β
entails α ⊃ β.
fact 20 α J β  α . β (Strict to Evidential X)
Proof. Assume that [α J β]w = 1. Then, for every w′, if [α]w′ = 1, then
[β]w′ = 1, and for every w′, if [β]w′ = 0, then [α]w′ = 0. Therefore, [α . β]w =
1.
fact 21 α . β  α ⊃ β (Evidential to Material X)
26 Iacona [21] discusses restricted connexivity in the framework of the strict interpretation.
27 Influential analyses of non-material monotonic conditionals have been sometimes integrated in
so-called dynamic semantics. A thorough comparison with these approaches would reveal even
more divergences from ours. For instance, in Veltman’s theory, presented in Veltman [43], True
Consequent is valid while Modus Tollens is not.
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Proof. This follows directly from fact 1.
More importantly, the evidential interpretation differs from the accounts
of conditionals advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others. We
will use the umbrella term ‘suppositional interpretation’ for these accounts,
regardless of the specific traits that characterize each of them, and we will
use the symbol ⇒ accordingly. Broadly speaking, α ⇒ β means that β is
credible enough given α. That is, on the supposition that α holds, there
are good chances that β holds. Just as the evidential interpretation, the
suppositional interpretation lies between the strict interpretation and the
material interpretation. But it is weaker than the evidential interpretation:
α . β entails α⇒ β, but not the other way round. Truth in the suppositional
sense is defined solely in terms of the Ramsey Test, so it holds no matter
whether the Reverse Ramsey Test is satisfied.
The relation between the evidential interpretation and the suppositional
interpretation can be stated more precisely by assuming that [α⇒ β]w = 1
if and only if (a) is satisfied. On this assumption, we have the following
equivalence:
fact 22 [α . β]w = 1 iff [(α⇒ β) ∧ (∼ β⇒∼ α)]w = 1
Proof. Assume that [α . β]w = 1. Since (a) holds for α and β, [α ⇒ β]w = 1.
Since (b) holds for α and β, (a) holds for ∼ β and ∼ α, hence [∼ β⇒∼ α]w =
1. Therefore, [(α ⇒ β) ∧ (∼ β ⇒∼ α)]w = 1. The proof of the right-to-left
direction is similar.
Fact 22 shows that . is definable in terms of⇒. The opposite is also true,
although less trivial, that is,⇒ is definable in terms of ..28
fact 23 [α⇒ β]w = 1 iff [(α ∧ β) ∨ (α . (α ∧ β))]w = 1
Proof. Assume that [(α ∧ β) ∨ (α . (α ∧ β))]w = 1. If [α ∧ β]w = 1, then w
verifies both the antecedent and the consequent of (a), while every other
world falsifies its antecedent. Therefore, [α⇒ β]w = 1. If [α . (α ∧ β)]w = 1,
then [α⇒ (α∧ β)]w = 1, which means that α∧ β is true in the closest worlds
in which α is true. It follows that β is true in the closest worlds in which α is
true, that is, [α⇒ β]w = 1.
Now assume that [α ⇒ β]w = 1. Then either [α]w = 1 or [α]w = 0. If
[α]w = 1, then [β]w = 1, for w verifies the antecedent of (a). It follows that
[α∧ β]w = 1, and consequently that [(α∧ β)∨ (α . (α∧ β))]w = 1. If [α]w = 0,
then [∼ α]w = 1, so [∼ α∨ ∼ β]w = 1. This entails that [(∼ α∨ ∼ β) ⇒∼
α]w = 1, for w verifies both the antecedent and the consequent of (a), while
every other world falsifies its antecedent. It follows that [∼ (α ∧ β) ⇒∼
α]w = 1, given that ∼ α∨ ∼ β is logically equivalent to ∼ (α ∧ β). Moreover,
the assumption that [α ⇒ β]w = 1 entails that [α ⇒ (α ∧ β)]w = 1: if β is
true in the closest worlds in which α is true, so is α ∧ β. By fact 22 we get
that [α . (α ∧ β)]w = 1, hence that [(α ∧ β) ∨ (α . (α ∧ β))]w = 1.
The contrast between . and ⇒ emerges clearly if we consider the prin-
ciples discussed in sections 6-8. As explained in section 6, Contraposition
holds for .. Instead, it does not hold for⇒. The examples that are usually
taken to show that Contraposition fails, such as the inference about the US
and North Vietnam, include concessive conditionals as premises, so they do
not work if conditionals are understood evidentially. But the same examples
28 We owe this equivalence result to Eric Raidl, who provides an extensive analysis of the mutual
definability of different kinds of conditional in Raidl [34].
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work if conditionals are understood suppositionally, for their premises turn
out to be true. By and large, concessive conditionals may be described as
conditionals that are true just in case they are true in the suppositional sense
but not in the evidential sense.29
Right Weakening produces opposite results: it holds for ⇒ but not for
.. The examples that can rightfully be taken to show that Right Weakening
fails, such as the inference about the letter, work only if conditionals are
understood evidentially, for they involve conclusions that are false in the
evidential sense. Instead, the same examples do not work if conditionals are
understood suppositionally, for their conclusions turn out to be true.
As explained in section 7, Conditional Excluded Middle and Conjunctive
Sufficiency do not hold for .. Instead, both principles hold for⇒. Although
the core idea of the suppositional interpretation — Ramsey’s original idea —
by itself does not entail Conditional Excluded Middle, and can be developed
in the way suggested by Lewis, a natural reading of that idea accords perfectly
well with Conditional Excluded Middle: to say that β does not hold on the
supposition that α holds is to say that ∼β holds on that supposition, so
denying α⇒ β amounts to asserting α⇒ ∼β. This is the reading adopted
by Adams and Stalnaker. Conjunctive Sufficiency is valid as well: if α and
β actually hold, then obviously there are good chances that β holds on the
supposition that α holds.
Finally, . and ⇒ agree on Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis and Restricted
Abelard’s Thesis, but they differ with respect to Restricted Aristotle’s Second
Thesis, as the latter does not hold for ⇒. Consider (11). Since (11) is
acceptable in the suppositional sense, if we replace its antecedent with ‘You
don’t drink a beer’ we obtain a conditional which is also acceptable in the
suppositional sense: there are good chances that its consequent holds on the
supposition that its antecedent holds.
Not only the evidential account differs from the suppositional theories of
conditionals in the way explained, but it also differs in important respects
from some recent attempts to provide a non-monotonic theory of condition-
als based on the notion of support. One is Rott’s interesting treatment of
“difference-making” conditionals, which adopts a strengthened version of the
Ramsey Test in the context of the classical theory of belief revision. Rott’s
account, like ours, invalidates Monotonicity and Right Weakening. Unlike
ours, however, it does not retain Contraposition, even though Contraposition
is consistent with the rejection of Monotonicity, provided that Right Weaken-
ing fails. As far as we can see, this result has no obvious rationale. Once the
concessive reading of ‘if then’ is ruled out, and the alleged counterexamples
such as that considered in section 6 loose their grip, it is no longer clear what
reason one may have for rejecting Contraposition.30
The other example is Douven’s epistemic analysis of conditionals, which
relies on a notion of evidential support defined in terms of degrees of
belief. Douven’s account yields a considerably weak logic, in which several
widely accepted principles, including Modus Ponens, turn out to be invalid.
Therefore, it significantly differs from our account, which preserves Modus
Ponens and other basic principles.31
The following table summarizes what has been said so far about the logi-
cal profile of the evidential interpretation, as it displays some key similarities
and differences between ⊃,⇒, ., and J.
29 This is in line with the analysis of “even if” suggested in Douven [13], p. 119.
30 Rott [37]. The account provided in Berto and Özgün [5] also entails failure of Contraposition.
31 Douven [13], ch. 5.
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⊃ ⇒ . J
Modus Ponens X X X X
Superclassicality X X X X
Identity X X X X
Necessary Consequent X X X X
Impossible Antecedent X X X X
False Antecedent X × × ×
True Consequent X × × ×
Linearity X × × ×
Conditional Proof X × × ×
Monotonicity X × × X
Transitivity X × × X
Contraposition X × X X
Right Weakening X X × X
Conditional Excluded Middle X X × ×
Conjunctive Sufficiency X X × ×
Restricted Selectivity × X X X
Restricted Abelard’s Thesis × X X X
Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis × X X X
Restricted Aristotle’s Second Thesis × × X X
We have reason to conjecture that the evidential account can effectively be
developed at the proof-theoretic level, namely, that there is an axiom system
for . that preserves the results listed in the third column above and is sound
and complete with respect to the semantics outlined in section 3. But we will
leave the proof of this conjecture to another work.
10 truth and assertibility
In this paper we pursue a truth-conditional approach to conditionals, that is,
we define the evidential interpretation by specifying the conditions under
which a conditional is true on that interpretation. More specifically, we adopt
a standard characterization of truth relative to worlds, and define logical
consequence accordingly.
This is not the only possibility, however. As is well known, an alternative
route is available, whereby truth conditions are deliberately avoided and
the semantics is framed in terms of assertibility. According to Adams,
who suggested this route, a conditional with antecedent α and consequent
β is assertible to the extent that the probability of β conditional on α is
high. In this analysis, the degree of assertibility of the conditional relative
to a probability distribution P is P(β|α), and its corresponding degree of
uncertainty is 1 minus that degree. Apart from specific limitations in the
expressive power of the underlying language, the logic of the suppositional
interpretation is then preserved in the assertibility approach provided that
a valid inference is defined as having the sum of the uncertainties of the
premises as an upper bound for the uncertainty of the conclusion under any
probability assignment.32
All this is standard and well received in the literature, especially among
authors who — unlike us — are skeptical either about possible worlds or
32 Adams [1], Adams [2].
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about the very idea of truth as applied to conditionals. More generally, the
logic of the suppositional interpretation largely survives across the divide
between accounts based on truth conditions versus assertibility conditions,
and this is rightly taken as a sign of the strength of that interpretation. So one
might wonder whether something similar can be said about the evidential
intepretation. After all, we have relied on the Chrysippus Test in order to
convey the idea of support from antecedent to consequent, but support is
well known to be amenable to a probabilistic characterization.
As it emerges from section 9, Adams’ account is based solely on the
Ramsey Test, so it cannot provide a credible reading of the Chrysippus
Test. In fact, his account implies that a conditional with antecedent α and
consequent β can be highly assertible even when α and ∼β are compatible in
a quite natural sense, and indeed independent, as illustrated by cases such
as (11). How can we define assertibility conditions in probabilistic terms if
we think that a conditional is assertible to the extent that the negation of its
consequent is incompatible with its antecedent?
Let us consider a conditional α . β. How should a plausible probabilistic
measure of the incompatibility of α and ∼β behave? First, it should be
symmetric, as noted in section 2, so that the incompatibility of α with ∼β
equals the incompatibility of ∼β with α for any probability distribution P.
Second, it should be maximal (that is, 1) in case P(α ∧ ∼β) = 0. Third, it
should be minimal (that is, 0) in case α and ∼β are either probabilistically
independent or positively correlated, namely, if P(α ∧ ∼β) ≥ P(α)P(∼β).
The simplest way to meet these constraints, it turns out, is to represent the
degree of incompatibility between α and ∼β as
1− P(α ∧∼β)
P(α)P(∼β)
provided that P(α ∧ ∼β) ≤ P(α)P(∼β), and 0 otherwise. For the limiting
cases in which P(α) = 0 or P(β) = 1, and thus P(α)P(∼β) = 0, the default
option is to say that incompatibility is still maximal (i.e., 1), for then again
P(α ∧∼β) = 0. If we now follow the idea of the Chrysippus Test and equate
the assertibility of α . β to the degree of incompatibility between α and ∼β,
we do recover appropriate connections with current probabilistic analyses
of support.33 To begin with, α . β turns out to be assertible to some degree
given P only if the supposition of α increases the probability of β, that is,
only if P(β|α) > P(β). Moreover, α . β is maximally assertible in case α
makes β certain, that is, when P(β) < 1 and P(β|α) = 1.
Once the assertibility of α . β is characterized in probabilistic terms, one
can apply Adams’ definition of validity and check the logical principles
discussed so far. In an extended investigation along this lines, we have
shown that the resulting logic implies exactly the same pattern of results
derived from our truth-conditional discussion above.34 So the evidential
interpretation is similar to the suppositional interpretation in one important
respect: its distinctive logical behaviour is robust across alternative frame-
works, and can be motivated both in modal terms and in probabilistic terms.
This correspondence, we submit, is not accidental, given the underlying idea
that the Chrysippus Test plays a key role in our understanding of support.
33 The resulting measure of assertibility amounts to the probabilistic measure of positive evidential
support as partial entailment advocated in Crupi and Tentori [7] and [8].
34 Crupi and Iacona [6].
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nexive Logics. IFCOLog Journal of Logics and their Applications, 3:341–355,
2016.
[16] A. S. Gillies. On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If). Philo-
sophical Review, 118:325–349, 2009.
[17] G. Gomes. Meaning-preserving contraposition of conditionals. Journal
of Pragmatics, (152):46–60, 2019.
20
[18] G. Gomes. Concessive Conditionals Without Even if and Nonconcessive
Conditionals with Even if . Acta Analytica, 35:1–21, 2020.
[19] F. Huber. The logic of theory assessment. Journal of Philosophical Logic,
36:511–538, 2007.
[20] A. Iacona. Indicative conditionals as strict conditionals. Argumenta,
4:177–192, 2018.
[21] A. Iacona. Strictness and Connexivity. Inquiry, online, 2020.
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